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PREFACE 
One research activity in the Management and Technology Area  Task on Technological 
Innovation has been investigation of the process of technological substitution using the system 
dynamics modeling technique. This  work has produced T E C H  1, a model that looks at techno- 
logical substitution as the outcome of market competition between an old and a new technology in 
a system in which production efficiency and product quallity improve through learning processes. 
(As documented in IIASA WP-79-104, WP-79-105 and WP-79-106.) 
T E C H  1 clearly assumes a market economy. In the model, price is continuously adjusted 
according to the balance of supply and demand, and investment occurs on the basis of returns on 
capacity, without reference to planning targets. Recognition of TECHl ' s  market economy orien- 
tation leads naturally to the question, "How much does the model's behavior depend on the 
market economy assumptions? How would model outcomes be different if the mechanisms used 
had been more descriptive of a planned economy. 
Thls  working paper presents the first stage of research on these questions Both for ease of 
construction and testing, and because the question of representing a planned market market 
mechanism is of interest in and of itself, our work on dynamic modeling of technolqgcal substitu- 
tion in a planned economy context began by with construction of a model of capacity formation 
and marketing in a planned economy. T h e  model, P L A N M K T ,  was formulated to be compar- 
able to the analagous mechanism used in T E C H  1 for the market economy case. It is intended 
that P L A N M K T  will eventually be used as a base for looking at technological substitution 
within a planned economy system. 
P L A N M K T ,  at this point, is a tentative and theoretical formulation. It has been tested for 
internal consistancy, but it has not undergone either testing using real data or careful examination 
and criticism by experts on planned market operation. This working paper is presented as a 
means of opening the model to scrutiny and criticism by persons knowlegable about the system it 
describes It is hoped that such criticims can lead to further work that will be useful and 
interesting both to economists interested in the planned market case and to those interested in the 
increasingly large portion of market economies that operates under some form of state control 
and planning. 
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PLANMKT:AN EXPLORATORY MODEL O F  T H E  MARKET MECHAN- 
ISM IN A PLANNED ECONOMY 
Jennifer M. Robinson 
INTRODUCTION 
The  following paper describes PLANMKT, a simple, general model of the market 
mechanism in a planned economy. The paper and the model are exploratory. The paper's pur- 
pose is to describe the model and its behavior and to ask where they are and are not reasonable. 
It begins with a description of model structure and proceeds to description of the behavior that 
eminates from that structure. 
Methodology 
PLANMKT is a system dynamics model, following the methodology developed by Jay 
Forrester and others at MIT. Basically this means that it represents the system being modeled 
as a set of state variables whase rates of change are regulated by nonlinear information flows. It 
also implies an attitude toward modeling which: 
- puts more emphasis on structure, and on the relationship between structure and 
behavior, than in parametric precision, 
- views structure in terms of state variables, feedback and nonlinearities, and 
- emphasizes that model validity should be assessed by reasonableness and insight- 
generating ability of model structure and behavior. 
For a fuller description of system dynamics the reader should refer to the sources listed in 
Appendix A. 
S T R U C T U R E  
People tend to think that markets operate very differently in planned economies than in a 
market economies. From a conventional economic perspective they do. Many operators are 
changed, to say nothing of the terminology used to describe operators. State plans and goals 
determine investment and price. One  can't assume profit-maximizing firms. T h e  meaning of 
supply curves becomes dubious, and hence, even though demand may still follow downward slop- 
ing curves, equilibrium prices cannot be calculated. 
Cybernetically, however, the differences are  not all that large. A s  shown in Figure 1, in 
both systems information about the state of the system is utilized in making decisions concerning 
price adjustments and resurce allocation (including investment) decisionm. In both systems 
adjustment decisions strive to maintain some balance between supply and demand. In both sys- 
tems demand can be decreased through increases in price and supply can be varied in the short 
term by varying capacity utilization and in the long term by altering investment. In both systems 
overproduction leads to excess inventories and underproduction leads to depleted inventories, 
perhaps accompanied by long waiting times for product delivery. 
MARKET DECISIONS INFORMATION 
Flgure 1: Common structure of free and planned market mechanisms. 
Behaviorally, too, there are similarities. Neither operates perfectly; both are prone to 
fluctuations, to alternation between overstocked and understocked shelves, on the whole the 
planned system tends to seek a dynamic balance with a tendency toward under, rather than 
over-supply; however this tendency varies greatly between products. 
The major differences seem to be that the planned economy places greater emphasis on 
politically determined goals, makes price and investments adjustments only occasionally, and 
tends to make large adjustments when adjustments are made, while the market economy adjusts 
more or less continuously, steering toward profits rather than politically determined targets. 
I find that what I would call investment decisions are ofren called raource a l laat~on decisions by planned 
markm eccnmnisrs. In the following text rhe word invesrmenr will ofren be used to designate rhe producer's 
resource allocation decisions. 
Representing a Planned Economy Market Structure 
As  just stated, price and investment levels of planned economies tend to change more 
slowly than those of market economies because adjustments require deliberate decisions by 
planners. In most market models price and investment vary continuously with market conditions. 
To convert the conventional market model to better describe a planned economy I have assumed 
price and investment are state variables and are adjusted periodically by rather large steps when 
system conditions imply an unsatisfactory balance of supply and demand. 
But which conditions? On what information are adjustments based? In practice this prob- 
ably depends on the social, technical and economic characteristics of the product in question. For 
export products, profitability factors are probably relatively important; profitability draws invest- 
ment, prices are set as high above costs as international competition will bear. For health-related 
goods and services, such as milk, fresh vegetables and sports and recreation, prices and invest- 
ment may be managed in order to keep per capita consumption to target levels. For other goods, 
adjustments may take place because symptoms of short supply, such as long waiting lines and 
long delivery delays, become disruptive or because symptoms of oversupply, in particular, the 
accumulation of large inventories. 
P L A N M K T  assumes the latter, inventory controlled, case. Figure 2 shows the price 
mechanism assumed. Price is a state variable. It is increased by an exogenously set percentage 
when inventories become so backlogged that waiting times exceed tolerance thresholds. It is 
assumed that planners will utilize the price mechanism less when prices have become very high 
and where further price increases will not have much influence on quantities demanded. (This 
mechanism has been added because without it prices have, in some simulations, increased a mil- 
lion fold under conditions of persistent inventory backlogs.) 
Price level is decreased, again by an exogenously set percentage, if inventories become 
overly large. The  target for inventory size is determined by an exponential averaging of past 
sales called expected sales (thus introducing an assumption that sales expectations are based on 
past sales). When actual inventories exceed expected sales by more than the tolerated amount, 
price is increased by an exogenously set percentage. In the form of the model shown here, con- 
stants are used for all the exogenous adjustment coefficients mentioned. If information were 
available about the likely behavior of these coefficients over time they could either be converted 
to exogenous variables or endogmized. 
Figure 3 shows how investment is modeled. T h e  central assumption behind this formula- 
tion is that planners base investment decisions on the difference between actual and target capa- 
city. Target capacity is increased by some percentage of present capacity when inventories fall 
below threshold values and is decreased when market coverage exceeds tolerance thresholds. 
T h e  formulation gains extra terms because I have assumed that planners, in comparing 
actual to target capacity, also take into account recent investments which have not yet come on 
line (investments in progress, xiip). T h e  formulation also assumes that in accounting for invea- 
ments in progress planners will distinguish between investments needed to replace depreciation 
and those leading to capacity expansion. 
I am told (verbal communication,H.D. Haustein) that in practice at least in the German 
Democratic Republic, price adjustments take place only rarely, and require the action of very 
high level planners; but that investment adjustments occur rather frequently, and may be made 
in a relatively decentralized fashion. This  distinction has been represented rather crudely in 
PLANMKT by making the threshold values at which price increases occur higher by a factor 
of 2 to 3 than those at which production targets are adjusted upwards. It would be more desir- 
able to permit price adjustments only every N years (where N typically is around 5) and permit 
production target adjustments every N months However, that would be a much more complex 
formulation given the software I am using. 
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Figure 2. Flow diagram for P L A N M K T  price mechanism. Rectangles represent state vari- 
ables, valves represent rates of change, single bounded circles represent auxiliaries-- 
instantaneously changing information variables that regulate rates of change--double bounded 
circles represent exogenously changing variables and line segments represent constants Solid 
connecting lines represent real flows, dotted connecting lines represent information flows. 
One  other mechanism can adjust supply. Capacity utilization may rise or fall according to 
inventory levels Unllke price and investment decisions, capacity utilization is assumed to vary 
continuously and may shift by relatively small increments. In test runs it is assumed that capa- 
city utilization can vary anywhere from zero to one hundered percent. Alternate assumptions can 
be tested by changing model parameters. 
Logically enough, investment, after a delay for construction and start up operations, leads to 
increased capacity thus to increased supply. Increased prices--because price elasticity of demand 
presumably holds in a planned economy--lead to decreased sales T h e  model can be parameter- 
ized for different delay times and different price elasticities of demand according to the 
product's nature. 
Finally, demand is subject to an underlying modal trend--either growth or decline--upon 
which is superimposed random variation. 
When all these factors are combined the resulting structure is as shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 3: Investment structure used in P L A N M K T  
BEHAVIOR 
Potential Tests 
In the previous text several adjustment coefficients have been mentioned. Most of these 
can be regarded as policy variables, that is, as factors on which planners actively or passively 
make decisions In addition P L A N M K T  contains several functional relationships and constants 
(e.g. price elasticities of demand) that differ for different commodities A t  present guessed 
parameters in what seem to be realistic ranges are used for all these variables. 
In the text below policy and structural coefficients are first listed, along with the values 
assumed in the base case run. Then the model's behavior in the base case run and a few vari- 
ants of it are discussed. It is clearly impractical to present sensitivity tests on showing the 
behavior of each of the twenty-some coefficients in PLANMKT;  first because the amount of 
work (and paper) involved would be enormous. Second because the results would be boring. 
Anyone interested in any particular set of tests is encouraged to run them himself. (The 
NDTRAN2lDYNAMO program for P L A N M K T  is presented in Appendix B.) 
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F i g u r e  4 .  Dynamic s t r u c t u r e  of PLANMKT.  
Policy Variables 
T h e  following variables can be altered in P L A N M K T  to describe different policy 
responses: 
1. xwdtl and xwdt2--waiting delay thresholds for price (xwdtl) and target capacity 
(xwdt2) adjustment. When inventory backlogs get so large that waiting times exceed 
the tolerance thresholds (measured here in months). price and target capacity adjuste- 
ments go into effect. x wdt l= 15, xwdt2-6 
2. xtif--target increase factor: e t s  the percentage of capacity by which target capacity 
level is increased when xwdt2 is exceeded. xtif=O.10 (10 percent) 
3. x$if--price increase factor. Sets the factor by which price levels are increased 
when xwdt 1 is exceeded. x$if= 1.5 
4. xit l  and xit2--inventories thresholds for price (xtil) and target capacity (xit2) 
decreases. When the ratio of inventory to annual expected sales (market coverage, 
xmc) exceeds these figures, production is deemed excessive and price and target 
capacity are adjusted downward. xitl=l.O, xit2= 1.0 
5. x#rf--price reduction factor: percentage by which price level is decreased when 
inventories exceed upper threshold (xitl). x$rf=0.5 
6. xtrf--target reduction factor: percentage by which target capacity is decreased 
when inventory exceeds upper threshold (xit2). xtrf=0.05 
'7. seft--sales expectation time: sample period over which sales expectations are 
formed. If, for example, seft=5, sales expectations are based on the sales records over 
the past 5 years, with a weighting that emphasizes recent years seft=5 
market coverage x $ :  price (monetary units) 
Figure 5.3: Capacity utilization curve Figure 5b: Quantities demanded curve 
Flgures 5a and 5b: Functional forms assumed for capacity utilization (5a) and quantities demand- 
ed as a function of price (5b). 
Structural Parameters 
T h e  following parameters should be adjusted to fit the model to specific commodities and 
specific market situations: 
1. alc--average lifetime of capacity (in years); determines depreciation rate. alc= 15 
2. xid--investment maturation delay; number of years between the time an invest- 
ment is made and new production capacity comes on line. xid=2 ' 
3. cuc--capacity utilization curve (in percent); sets capacity utilization rate as a func- 
tion of market coverage (market coverage is defined as the ratio of inventory to 
expected sales). Curve as shown in Figure 5a. 
+ mgr--market growth rate (percent per annum). Sets the rate at which the quantity 
of product demanded would grow if price remained connant. mgr=.03 
5. msd--market standard deviation; sets the standard devialion of the normally dis- 
tributed noise parameter affecting sales. msd-0.1 with mean of 1 
6. pmdc--price multiplier on demand curve (in percent); increases and decreases 
demand as a function of price. Curve as shown in Figure 5b. 
General Behavior Trends 
Figures 6a and 6b  show an 80  year simulation run of P L A N M K T .  Figure 6a shows the 
behavior of capacity, target capacity and inventory; Figure 6b  shows the behavior of price, 
expected waiting time sales and market size. 
T h e  two figures reveal that the system tends to manifests slow, convergent oscillations. 
Over  the 8 0  year period there are two phases where targets and investment do not expanded 
fast enough to keep supply up with demand. This  results in inventory backlogs and lengthened 
waiting times for product delivery. Long waiting times lead to adjustments, first of production 
targets and inveament, and second, of price. The  condition of backordered supply persists over 
much of the simulated period, although the system is able to prevent expected waiting time from 
ever going over 18 months. 
In Figure 6b it may be observed that sales behaves eratically, but tends to keep pace with 
market growth. One  should not make much of sales variation, as it is theconsequence of a ran- 
dom fluxuation imposed on the model's demand term. (Demand is multiplied by a number with 
a mean of 1 and a standard deviation of 10 percent.) Thus  it is far more significant that random 
sales variation is absorbed by the system than that sales behave randomly. This  feature of the 
system merits further attention. I am under the impression that the market economy market for- 
mulation might amplify rather than mitigating sales variability. It may turn out that the market 
mechanisms of a planned economy (at least that in P L A N M K T )  are simply better buffered 
against unpredictable consumer behavior than are their market economy equivalent. 
It is interesting that the system eventually stabilizes in a behavior mode that doesn't use the 
price mechanism. Begnning at year 42 inventories p negative and waiting time for product 
delivery begins to lengthen. This leads to upward adjustment of production targets and leads to 
increased investment. In time the inventory backlog begins to diminish. 
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Figures 6a and 6b. Behaviors of key variables in 60 year base 
case. simulation. 
Environmental Conditions 
Below the system's response to environmental conditions is illustrated with analyses of its 
behavior under different rates of market growth and different delay lengths for capacity expan- 
sion. Tests not described here show that the system is extremely good at damping out increases 
In the variability of demand (msd), and that it may or may not be sensitive to changes in the 
response of capacity utilization to market coverage (cuc), price elasticity of demand (pmdc) and 
the average lifetime of capacity, depending on the magnitude of the changes made and the way 
the system is tuned. For example, system's sensitivity to price elasticity of demand (obviously) 
depends on whether and how it employs the price mechanism; likewise, its sensitivity to rates of 
depreciation differs according to whether or not it responds rapidly to evidence of supply short- 
fall. 
Market growth: Growth of market demand varies greatly between commodities. Figures 
7% 7b, 7c and 7d compare the respective behaviors of capacity, expected waiting time, inventory 
and price at four different rates of market growth. In these plots, the four rates tested, and the 
scenario numbers used to stand for them are: 
scenario market growth rate 
1 5 percent per year 
2 (base case) 3 " 0, I* 
3 1 "  " "  
4 0 " I, I 
(Note that the high growth scenario is quite unrealistic--few commodities have been able to 
maintain a 5 percent annual rate of demand increase for 80 years, especially not under cir- 
cumstances of low population growth, as seen in most planned economies.) 
T o  interpret the plots, I recommend taking one scenario and looking at the behavior of all 
three variables, then iterating the procedure for the other scenarios, and then comparing the 
results. By this means you may observe that while the system is basically stable under all four 
market growth scenarios it faces larger inventory and greater problems with large order back- 
logs under the higher growth scenarios. This results in two instances of major price increases for 
the 5 percent growth case and one incidence for the 3 percent case. T h e  slow growth scenarios, 
on the other hand put through minor price decreases (which put them off scale on the 
DYNAMO plots) in about the 35th year of simulation. In neither high growth scenario does the 
waiting time ever exceed 20 months, and in both cases the system progressively decreases the 
peak waiting time at each long term inventory swing. 
It is also interesting that faster growth seems to result in faster inventory oscillations For 
example, in Figures 7b and 7c, scenario 1, the 5 percent growth case, reaches its first waiting 
delay peak and inventory trough a few years earlier than the three percent growth case, which in 
turn reaches its first trough a few years before the 1 percent case. 
In the two slow growth scenarios, price adjustments are little used and those that take place 
are minor. Furthermore, in both the 1 percent demand growth and the constant demand 
scenarios, the system stabilizes at about the 30th year of simulation with positive inventories, and 
hence zero waiting time for product deliveries. 
Delay Time: Another property that varies greatly between products is the amount of time 
required to expand capacity. For example, it may be possible to set up a new shop for assembly 
of electronic equipment in a few months, while construction of a new nuclear power station will 
generally take several years. Within the structure of P L A N M K T ,  lengthening the capacity 
expansion delay time results in increasing the time required to correct an intolerable supply 
deficit though investment. This, in turn, causes lengthened expected waiting times and may 
force more frequent utilization of the price mechanism. 
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Figures 8% 8b, 8c and 8d contrast the behaviors of capacity, expected waiting time, inven- 
tory and price for capacity expansion. Delay lengths correspond to plot numbers as  follow^: 
scunmio caprrcity expansion delay length 
1 5 years 
2 (base case) 2 " 
3 1 " 
As shown in the plots, the system behaves contrary to expectation in one respeb: the longer 
the delay time, the less the inventory fluctuation and the more gradual the adjustment to condi- 
tions of long waits. The difference in behavior stems from the difference in use of the price 
mechanism. The longer the capacity expansion delays, the longer waiting times become (8b). the 
higher prices are driven (ad), the more demand is driven downward, and the more rapidly the 
system moves into a condition of positive inventories and zero waiting time (8b). Because the 
price mechanism does not assist investment i n  stabilizing the system in scenario 3, it has has 
much greater inventory swings (8c -- note, 3 goes off the map in this figure). 
In other words, the squeaky wheel--the case that shows the most obvious difficulties--gets 
greased; and frequent greasing may lead to better overall performance. 
I leave it to others to ascertain this finding's realism. Do, in reality, products with longer 
capacity expansion delays sometimes turn out to be more stable in planned economies than pro- 
ducts with shorter delays? It would not surprise me if they did; however, I suspect the mechan- 
ism involved might be much more general than that observed in the above tests: that products 
for which plant expansion is slow are generally more capital intensive and more expensive; thus 
they probably receive greater attention from planners than relatively cheap and easy products, 
and hence (presuming that more adjustent and more planning does stabilize a product's 
behavior) they should be more stable. 
POLICY TESTS 
PLANMKT is an inventory controlled system. Its self-regulating mechanisms operate to 
keep inventories within certain tolerance thresholds. First investment and second, in  more 
extreme cases, prices are adjusted when chase bounds are overstepped. The threshold indices 
used are positive inventories, which policy makers are assumed to attempt to keep to a given 
fraction of expected annual sales, and inventory backlogs (negative inventories), which they are 
assumed to try to keep sufficiently low that the waiting times for product delivery do not become 
unacceptably long. 
Two sorts of changes can be employed within this set-up; those which alter the thresholds 
within which inventory movement is tolerated before corrective actions are taken and those 
which alter the strength of the actions taken when inventories go beyond tolerance thresholds. 
For example, a policy maker who felt that current investment practices were not producing the 
desired results might either lower (or raise) tolerance thresholds or increase (or decrease) the size 
of the adjustment made when thresholds are overstepped--or both. 
The two sets of policy tests described below explore, respectively, the consequences of alter- 
ing boundary locations and altering the extent to which capacity targets (which control invest- 
ment) and prices are adjusted when the system goes beyond tolerance thresholds. 
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Inventory Tolerance Policies 
Figures 9a, 9b, 9c and 9d show the effects of alternately doubling and halving the values of 
inventory and waiting delay thresholds. As in Figures 'la, 7b, 'lc and 7d these use a comparative 
plot format, with the base case plot labelled with the number 1 and other scenarios numbered 
2,3,4 and 5 plotted against it. Below the results of different scenarios are described separately. 
Scenario 2 - Low inventory tolerance: What happens if the planners decide that 
the accumulation of inventories is wasteful and react to it by lowering- the amount of 
inventory they will accept before reducing investment and prices? In the base case 
prices and target capacities were adjusted downward when inventories exceeded the 
expected annual sales. In Scenario 2, price and target capacities are adjusted when 
inventory exceeds six months worth of expected sales. 
Trying to avoid inventory accumulations in this fashion results in production targets grow- 
ing too slowly to keep u p  with market demand; inventory backlogs become very large and price 
adjustments become a regular cyclic process. Prices both rise higher and drop lower than they 
do in the standard run (or any other of the scenarios considered). 
Scenario 3 -- Tigh ter  controls in two directions: Scenario 2 introduced a lopsided 
tightening of controls; it lowered the tolerance points for inventory accumulation and 
hastened downward price and capacity target adjustments without altering the toler- 
ance points at which inventory backlogs stimulate upward adjustment of prices and 
capacity targets. In scenario 3 the inventory tolerances, as in scenario 2, are set at 6 
months supply -- half as large as in the base case scenario; meanwhile, tolerances for 
inventory backlogs (and thus expected waiting times) are also halved from the base 
case values so that prices are adjusted upwards when expected waiting time reaches 
7.5 months and production capacity targets are adjusted upward when expected wait- 
ing time reaches 3 months. 
Scenario 3 leads to more frequent adjustments and lessened overall deviation from the 
trend line. Inventory cycles are reduced from about 60 years in the base case and scenario 1 to 
about 20 years and prices are adjusted upward an downward in the case of each cycle. This 
seems logical; if you are trying to keep a system within tighter bounds you can expect to have to 
manipulate its controls more frequently. 
Scenario 4 -- Loosened controls in both directions: Given that tightening the 
upper and lower inventory tolerances for inventory control leads to more frequent 
adjustment and more tightly bounded system behavior. one would expect that loosen- 
ing of controls would lead to less frequent adjustment and greater swings in system 
behavior. In scenario 4 this expectation is tested by taking 'the reciprocal' of scenario 
3; instead of halving the base case upper and lower tolerances for inventory fluctua- 
tion the two are doubled. 
As anticipated, scenario 4 manifests very slow, large swings in inventory behavior. How- 
ever, because the tolerance that must be exceeded before price adjustment is made is also very 
large, prices remain unchanged throughout almost the entire 80 years of simulated time. 
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Scenario 5 -- Lopsided expansion of thresholds: Here the inventory thres- 
holds (which affect price and target reduction) are kept doubled, as in scenario 4, 
while the waiting delay thresholds (which affect price and target increases) are 
returned to the base case values (half the values of scenario 4). It is noteworthy that 
the reverse action -- holding inventory thresholds to their base case values while 
using doubled waiting delay tolerances -- produces output that is virtually indistin- 
guishable from scenario 4. This  indicates that the mechanism for downward adjust- 
ment of prices and capacity targets was unimportant in scenario 4. 
Adjustment Speed Policies 
Figures 10% lob, 1Oc and 10d show the effects of tests altering the speeds at which prices 
and targets are increased and reduced. T h e  four scenarios considered derrive from alternate 
halving and doubling adjustment rates as shown below: 
scenario price price target target 
increase decrease increase decrease 
%$if x$rf xtif xtrf 
1 basecase 1.5 0.2 5 0.1 0.1 
2 fast 2.0 0.25 0.2 0.1 
3 slow1 1.25 0.2 5 0.05 0.1 
4 slow2 1.25 0.125 0.05 0.05 
Scenario 2 features price and target increase rates that are twice as fast as those in the base case 
scenario and decrease rates that are the same as in the base case. (A scenario that doubled price 
and target reduction rates as well as increase rates was also tested, but it proved identical to 
scenario 2, thus it is not shown.) Scenario 3 price and target increase rates that are half those in 
the base case scenario, with decrease rates unchanged. In scenario 4, both increase and decrease 
rates for targets and prices are halved from the base case values. 
In general these tests suggest that faster adjustment leads to larger capacities and inven- 
tories. (The higher values may be an artifact of the threshold and adjustment values used in the 
base case. I have assumed that target decreases are only half as fast as target increases in the 
base case.) Because capacity and inventory values are generally greater in the fast adjustment 
scenarios, waiting times and prices remain lower, and price adjustments are less frequent. The  
model does not show it, but these scenarios also will necessarily require more investment. 
Scenario 2, in which target and price rates are twice their values in the base case, has the 
greatest tendency to increase capacity (see lOa), the largest and fastest inventory swings (lob) 
and the shortest waiting times ( 1 0 ~ )  and lowest priced (10d). By contrast, scenarios 3 and 4, 
which have slow target and price adjustment rates keep lower average values of capacity and 
inventory and manifest smaller and slower inventory fluxuations than either the base case or fast 
adjustment cases. in capacity and inventory and maintains the highest prices and the longest 
waiting times. 
It is interesting to note that here asymmetrical adjustment does not appear to be destabiliz- 
ing; indeed, the model seems insensitive to the speeds at which price and target capacity are 
decreased. Further testing would be required to establish whether downward adjustments would 
be more critical in a market that was not growing at 3 percent per year. 
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General Remarks on Policy Tests 
T h e  tests described above are sufficient only to support some impressionistic remarks about 
the effects of policy changes within the P L A N M K T  system. However, they suggest that the 
system has the following attributes 
First, planners seem to have ability to control many aspects of system behavior, including 
periodicity and amplitude and mean values of cycles by manipulating variables such as price and 
conditions at which they change production targets (and investment behavior). Very large 
differences in system response are caused by varying the threshold values at which prices and 
investment t a r p t s  adjusted. 
In practice decision-makers are probably more concerned with management of the system 
as a whole than with regulating the behavior of isolated segments of the production system, and 
therefore do not often deliberately manipulate specific thresholds to attain desired responses. For 
example, investment decisions seem to be made through a process of ranking and priority setting 
between potential areas of investment as much or more than through looking at inventory back- 
logs or accumulations. Likewise, price setting seems to be oriented to keeping prices in line with 
input costs and social costs and/or benefits as much or more than it is used for inventory control. 
Thus while ability to control exists, it is unlikely to be systematically used. This, in effect, means 
that structures such as P L A N M K T  are likely to be more useful as forecasting devices than as 
devices for deciding where to set investment and price levels. 
Second, it appears that fine tuning is possible -- if decision-makers are willing to make fre- 
quent adjustments and if they keep required balances between control parameters. For example, 
adjusting the upper bounds in a set of control parameters without complementary adjustment of 
the lower bounds may destabilize the system. I expect that planners have gained a g o d  intuitive 
feel for many such features of system behavior; however, there are probably some areas in which 
Intuition leads to suboptimal, if not self-defeating, policies and in which experimentation with 
formal models could lead to more effective management. 
Third,  in most cases the system moves slowly. In some cases a full inventory cycle takes 60 
years. Given that the USSR is the only planned economy that is over 60 years old, and that no 
socialist economy has enjoyed disaster-free development (World War 2 counts as a disaster) for 
more than about 30 years, much of the behavior predicted by P L A N M K T  can only be specula- 
tive. What's more, even if such behavior has been manifested in reality, much of it is unlikely to 
have been observed because few observational techniques used in economics and/or management 
will pick u p  slow sorts of behavior. 
Fourth, and most abstractly, because the mechanisms that affect periodic behavior in 
planned economies appear to have quite different--and perhaps much more variable--time con- 
stants than the analagous mechanisms in market economies one might expect to see rather 
different long term swings in the economic behavior of planned economies. For example, the 
business cycle and the Kuznets cycle may not exist, but other patterns of systematic modulation 
may develop. 
APPENDIX A: ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY O N  SYSTEM DYNAMICS 
Forrester, Jay W. (1973) Industrial Dynamics. Cambridge, Massachusetts: M I T  Press. 
A relatively old text, first published in 1962, but remains a standard and valu- 
able text Lays out the precepts of system dynamics and develops some case applica- 
tions, all of which are industrial. Sophisticated, deserves reading in depth, not recom- 
mended for casual reading. 
--------- (1968) Principles of Systems. Cambridge, Massachusetts: M I T  Press. 
Standard elementary text. Solid, but abecidarian. If your background is non- 
technical and you like to have things simply and clearly explained this is the right 
text. If you want to get right into the hard stuff, you will find it irritating. 
- - - - - - - - (ed.) (1974) Collected Papers of Jay W. Forrester. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Wright-Allen Press. 
For further study. Includes some of Forrester's more important papers. Does 
better as a complement to basic texts than as a stand-alone volume. 
Goodman, Michael R. (1974) Study Notes in System Dynamics. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
W right-Allen Press. 
Generally used as an intermediate to advanced text in system dynamics courses. 
Good as an aid to helping one understand how system dynamics models work. Con- 
tains many exercises, not all of which are easy, and answers to exercise questions 
Pugh, Alexander L. III (197 ) DYNAMO User's Manual. Cambridge, Massachusetts. MIT 
Press. 
The authoritative user's manual for the DYNAMO language (used for most 
system dynamics simulation). Look for latest edition. Generally not needed as 
DYNAMO is quite simple to use and other texts supply adequate information. 

